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ABSTRACT
Nigerian company law requires that partnerships of more than 20 persons be
incorporated and penalizes those who conduct business in violation of this
requirement. The requirement has its conceptual roots in the affairs that
precipitated the English Bubble Act of 1720 and its doctrinal origin goes at
least as far back as the Joint Stock Companies Registration, Incorporation and
Regulation Act of 1844. This article argues that whatever may be the merits of
the requirement as enshrined in English company law, the requirement is
unconstitutional when transposed into federal legislation within the current
constitutional framework of Nigeria. The article further argues that, beyond the
issue of constitutionality, the requirement in question is, in policy terms,
socially inefficient and illegitimate and that it thus implicates significant suboptimality. From this basic position the article goes on to draw out broader
lessons and implications for the theory and practice of legal transplantation,
whether in the post-colonial context or in the current context of heightened
harmonization of laws across jurisdictions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 19 of the Nigerian Companies and Allied Matters Act
(CAMA),1 prohibits with a few exceptions, partnerships of more than
twenty persons.2 This article examines the doctrinal validity of this

1. See generally Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, http://www.nigeria-law.org/
LFNMainPage.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
2. Companies and Allied Matters Act (2004) § 19 (Nigeria). Section 19 of CAMA
provides thus:
1. No company, association or partnership consisting of more than 20 persons
shall be formed for the purpose of carrying on any business for profit or
gain by the company, association, or partnership, or by the individual
members thereof, unless it is registered as a company under this Act or is
formed in pursuance of some enactment in force in Nigeria.
2. Nothing in this section shall apply to―
a. any cooperative society registered under the provisions of the any
enactment in force in Nigeria; or
b. any partnership for the purpose of carrying on practice
i. as legal practitioners, by persons each of whom is a legal
practitioner; or
ii. as accountants by persons each of whom is entitled by law to
practice as an accountant.
3. If at any time the number of members of a company, association or partnership
exceeds 20 in contravention of this section and it carries on business for
more than 14 days while the contravention continues, every person who is a
member of the company, association or partnership during the time that it
so carries on business after those 14 days shall be liable to a fine of N25 for
every day during which the default continues.
4. If at any time the number of members of a company, association or partnership
exceeds 20 in contravention of this section and it carries on business for more
than 14 days while the contravention continues, every person who is a member
of the company, association or partnership during the time that it so carries
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prohibition in constitutional terms as well its justification in policy
terms. The article concludes that the prohibition lacks doctrinal support
in the constitution and that this aside, it also lacks policy justification in
light of realities of the economic and social processes. Given the English
antecedents of Nigerian business legislation, the article is theoretically
located within colonial and postcolonial comparative discourse.
Part II of the article gives a brief background and history of the
prohibition. Part III examines its constitutional validity and Part IV provides
an assessment of its policy justifications. Finally, Part V embodies
concluding remarks.
II. BACKGROUND
The CAMA’s prohibition of partnerships involving more than twenty
persons is a carry-over from § 377 of the 1968 Companies Decree,3
which adopted it from § 434 of the English Companies Act 19484 and §
120(1) of the English Companies Act 1967.5 Indeed this provision has
been a feature of English Companies legislation at least since the first
statute permitting the routine incorporation of companies, the Joint Stock
Companies Registration, Incorporation and Regulation Act of 1844.6
This 1844 statute pegged at twenty-five the maximum number of persons
permitted to carry on business as an association—as a partnership—
without incorporation.
Prior to the enactment of the CAMA, the Nigerian Law Reform
Commission (Commission) reviewed its predecessor, the 1968 Companies

on business after those 14 days shall be liable to a fine of N25 for every day
during which the default continues.
3. Companies Decree No. 51 (1968) § 377 (Nigeria).
4. English Companies Act, 1949, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 434 (Eng.).
5. The 1967 Companies Act of England introduced the exemption granted to
accountants and solicitors to form partnerships of more than twenty persons. That
exception, as modified, is now embodied in subsection 2 of § 19 of the CAMA discussed
infra (footnotes 46–47 and related text). Companies and Allied Matters Act, supra note
2, § 19.
6. Joint Stock Companies Registration, Incorporation and Regulation Act, 1844,
7 & 8 Vict., c. 110 (Eng.). It should be noted that the prohibition of partnerships of more
than twenty persons was lately contained in § 716(1) of the UK Companies Act 1985,
which has now been repealed by Schedule 16 of the Companies Act 2006 and Art. 2 of
the prior Regulatory Reform (Removal of 20 Member Limit in Partnerships etc.) Order
2002, S.I. 2002/3203, art. 3 (U.K.), http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si200232. The prohibition
has as such been omitted from the UK Companies Act 2006.
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Decree. As part of the review process, it examined the prohibition at
issue, but saw nothing problematic about it. The Commission therefore
made largely token or ministerial adjustments to the provision, with the
exception of the addition of an exemption for partnerships involving
lawyers and those involving accountants. These professional partnerships
may now exceed the twenty person limit without violating the law.7 The
prohibition, thus adjusted, was reenacted in § 19 of the CAMA. The
Commission’s working papers showed little evidence of deep analysis of
the provision and its ramifications. It referred only to the Report of the
Jenkins Committee in England8 in justifying the prohibition as being for
the purpose of protecting the public from the hazards of dealing with
large and fluctuating partnerships.9
III. CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY
Nigeria operates as a presidential federalism broadly patterned after
the American federal system and constitution. The Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (1999 Constitution) (hereinafter
referred to as the Constitution or the 1999 Constitution) in the exclusive
legislative list thereto, delineates the province of the Nigerian Federal
Government’s (Federal Government) legislative competence. That
province is extensive, but it does not go so far as to encompass the
regulation of partnerships. The concurrent legislative list to the same
1999 Constitution similarly does not encompass partnerships as an item
within the joint legislative competence of the Federal Government and
the States. The 1999 Constitution therefore leaves partnerships and
associated matters to the residual legislative list, which falls squarely
within the legislative competence of the states. In essence, the 1999
Constitution has not empowered the Federal Government to enact
provisions such as that in § 19 of the CAMA, which seeks to regulate the
formation and size of partnerships. Some states of Nigeria such as
Lagos and the states of the former Western Region have legislated on
partnerships,10 though many other states have not, relying seemingly on
7. See T HE N IGERIAN L AW R EFORM C OMMISSION , W ORKING P APERS ON THE
REFORM OF NIGERIAN COMPANY LAW, Vol. I (Review and Recommendations) Part II,
“Incorporation of Companies and Incidental Matters” ¶¶ 10–14 (1987–1988).
8. BOARD OF TRADE, REPORT OF THE COMPANY LAW COMMITTEE, 1962, Cmnd.
1749, at 76.
9. THE NIGERIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 7, ¶ 10.
10. See The Partnership Law of Lagos State, Cap. P1, Laws of Lagos State
of Nigeria 2003. See also The Partnership Act, (1959) Cap. 86, Vol. IV, Laws of the Western
Region of Nigeria (adopted and reenacted by several states in the area of the former Western
Region of Nigeria, an example being the Partnership Law, (1978) Cap. 84, Laws of Ondo
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preexisting principles of common law or Statutes of General Application
in force in England on January 1, 2000.11 The fact that many states have
not enacted laws concerning partnerships is however hardly important
here, since the Constitution simply has removed the prerogative of
legislating on partnership matters from the Federal Government and
entrusted it exclusively to the states via the residual legislative list. The
legislative jurisdiction is not a concurrent one shared between the federal
and state governments.
It is possible for a reader to miss the significance of the foregoing
point regarding the unconstitutionality of the prohibition in § 19 of the
CAMA, seeing that it is so plainly stated. It therefore bears mentioning
that the validity of that prohibition has for more than half a century been
an article of faith amongst lawyers and regulators in Nigeria. To declare
its constitutional invalidity is, therefore, to undertake an iconoclastic
endeavor of no mean order. Indeed, while the point is rather simply
presented in the foregoing paragraph, its derivation is neither simple nor
apparent. This explains why the Commission which reviewed earlier
versions of the prohibition as well as several other legislative agencies
have, through the years, assumed the constitutionality of the prohibition
and proceeded on that basis.12 While ostensibly aware of the states’
State of Nigeria). Interestingly, § 2(3) of the Partnership Law of Lagos State seemingly
acknowledges and yields to the provisions of § 19 of the CAMA which limits partnerships to
no more than twenty persons. Perhaps this is a tip of the hat to Federal might, in recognition
of the historical fact that under the 1960 and 1963 constitutions the federal government
had the power to make laws for the Federal Capital Territory (Lagos) on any matter including
partnerships. See CONSTITUTION, § 64 (1960) (Nigeria); see also CONSTITUTION, § 69 (1963)
(Nigeria). Such a tip of the hat would however be quite outlandish given the fact that the
Federal Government currently lacks constitutional authority over partnerships per se.
11. The notable English statute in this wise is the Partnership Act of 1890. The
statutes of general application are enforceable in Nigeria by virtue of provisions such as
§ 32(1) of the Interpretation Act Cap I 23 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, and
the various High Court Laws which mimic the Interpretation Act. The standard formula
is for these provisions to import into and make applicable in Nigeria, the common law of
England, the doctrines of equity and the statutes of general application in force in
England on January 1, 1900. This scheme of importation aside, certain English statutes and
orders in council enacted prior to October 1, 1960 were extended to Nigeria. (It has been
noted however that the Revised Edition of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria Decree
#21 of 1990 precludes the continued application in Nigeria of certain imperial statutes
and orders in council set forth therein, these being no longer relevant to Nigeria. See
CHARLES MWALIMU, THE NIGERIAN LEGAL SYSTEM: PUBLIC LAW, VOL. I, 22–23 (2005).
12. See The Partnership Law of Lagos State, supra note 10 (promulgated by the
legislature of Lagos State, which seemingly acknowledges and yields to the logic of § 19
of the CAMA which limits partnerships to no more than twenty persons).
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legislative competence on partnership matters, these agencies have
simultaneously taken for granted the Federal Government’s power to
legislate on the subject. In essence, they have assumed concurrent
federal and state legislative competence at best, or worse, exclusive
federal legislative competence by way of preemption. Beyond the
foregoing, the unconstitutionality of § 19 as canvassed is also significant
because the persistence through the years of the prohibition therein
presents us with lessons and insights in the area of cross-border
reception of laws or legal transplantation, especially in the colonial and
postcolonial contexts. The prohibition in § 19 of the CAMA is after all,
English in origin, while the constitutional framework in the context of
which its invalidity is canvassed is an American style federal constitution
enacted and applied in a plural postcolonial African social environment.13
A multiplicity of legal cultures is therefore implicated, with opportunities
for comparative analysis.
A. Derivation and Origins
If the regulation of partnerships is clearly within the legislative
purview of the states under the 1999 Constitution, how is it then that the
Federal Government has ended up legislating on it in § 19 of the
CAMA? To understand the derivation of the prohibition in § 19 and
hence the difficulties that militate against the ready appreciation of its
constitutional status, a historical perspective is apposite.
The provisions on partnerships as embodied in the CAMA have some
affinity to the provisions on private companies (i.e. close corporations).
This is because most private companies are in a sense, incorporated
partnerships.14 So there has been a tendency for Anglo-Nigerian legislatures,
13. Nigeria or parts thereof was a colony of Britain from the late nineteenth
century until 1960 when it gained political independence from Britain. In that period
English law and legal processes were transplanted into the colony, including English style
parliamentary government. Federalism was incorporated into this Westminster style government
in 1954. This federal arrangement was changed into an American style presidential
government in 1979 with the introduction of the now-repealed 1979 constitution. The
current 1999 constitution maintains this federal presidential system. See CONSTITUTION,
§ 130 (1999) (Nigeria), available at http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederal
RepublicofNigeria.htm.
14. Partnership is a business association undergirded by a high degree of interpersonal
connection between the constituent members. Clive Schmitthoff, following an examination
of a line of English cases, has noted the intimacy that is similarly at the heart of the
relationship between the members of a private company. See Clive M. Schmitthoff, How
the English Discovered the Private Company, in PIETER ZONDERLAND, QUO VADIS IUS
SOCIETATUM? LIBER AMICORUM PIETER SANDERS 183, 187–91, 193 (Kluwer–Deventer
Martinus Nijhoff-’S-Gravenhage, 1972). He opined that “[t]he essential characteristic of
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in formulating companies legislation, to address aspects of partnership
regulation that lie at the intersection of both forms of business
organization. One of such aspects naturally is the relationship between
large unincorporated partnerships and the incorporated company, especially
in connection with relative size and the requirements of incorporation.15
With particular reference to relative size, one of the perennial problems
has been the delimitation of the point at which the partnership should
end and the private company begin (i.e. the maximum number of members
a partnership can have before it becomes so large as to necessitate a
peremptory requirement as to its incorporation).16 This tendency or
perceived need to simultaneously address aspects of partnership law
the private company in its true meaning is, as Lord Wilberforce put it, that it is an
association founded on a personal relationship.” Id. at 193. The private company is then as
its conceptual core little more than an incorporated partnership. Many of such companies
were effectively partnerships incorporated in order to secure limited liability, perpetual
succession, and the other benefits attendant upon incorporation, a fact recognized in the
judgment of Lord Wilbeforce in Re Westbourne Galleries Ltd. See generally, Ebrahimi
v. Westbourne Gallaries Ltd. [1972] 2 All E.R. 492, 500 (Eng.).
15. The Nigerian Law Reform Commission made a statement that bears this point
out. The Commission stated that it was discussing the prohibition of partnerships exceeding
certain numbers only because the prohibition creates an obligation to incorporate a
company in certain circumstances. See NIGERIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note
7, ¶ 10.
16. This problem of delineating the boundary of the two business forms is
quantitative as well as qualitative. Quantitatively the problem manifests itself as one of
specifying the number of members beyond which a partnership must incorporate—and
this is the form of the problem apparent in § 19 of the CAMA. Beyond this the problem
also manifests itself qualitatively as one of specifying the nature of the constituents of a
private company, for example whether a private company can meaningfully be constituted
(and whether it ought properly be constituted) by persons who lack the sort of affinity
and personal connections that attend the members of a partnership—connections that are
indeed assumed by partnership law. If a private company can be constituted by persons
who lack the intimacy that attends a partnership, then this qualitatively distinguishes the
private company from the partnership and reinforces the quantitative limits placed on the
membership of a partnership. If not, that quantitative limit may seem a little arbitrary, at
least when not viewed from a securities regulation perspective. The qualitative aspect of
the problem is more theoretical in character and is not reflected in the CAMA, although
it is incipient in the case law. See generally Schmitthoff, supra note 14. See also Westbourne
Galleries, 2 All E.R. 492, 498–500. In the United States, the decision in Galler v Galler,
32 Ill.2d 16 (1965) (Supreme Court of Illinois) also reveals an incipient, albeit less discernible,
recognition of this problem. The court there spoke of the impossibility in close corporations
(i.e. private companies) of securing “independent board judgment free from personal
motivations concerning corporate policy.” Id. at 584. Viewed qualitatively, the issue is whether
the province of the partnership goes as far as encompassing that of the private company
or whether the private company properly belongs instead within the same province as the
public company.
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together with aspects of private company regulation accounts, in significant
measure, for the regulation of the size of large partnerships in earlier
English company legislation and the British administrators’ transposition
of such treatment into colonial Nigerian companies legislation, and
ultimately into the postcolonial successors to such legislation of which
the CAMA is the latest. However, in the case of the CAMA the transposition
was effected, not by British colonial administrators, but by Nigerian
regulators unwittingly following a pre-established script or mindset that
habituated them to such transposition. Nigerian regulators were, in so
doing, yielding to a regulatory disposition that is too often manifest in
postcolonial Nigerian legislation, in which the legislator turns instinctively
and repeatedly to the easy routine of familiar colonial approaches, even
while professing to strike out in a new direction. The result is legislative
atavism in which old colonial rules and approaches reappear in a
postcolonial setting, notwithstanding professions of change, implicit or
explicit, by the legislature. We shall return to this theme later in this part
of the article. Suffice it to say that at this point the persistence in CAMA
§ 19 of the ban on large partnerships, after the underlying constitutional
framework was dismantled in the postcolonial era, is a result of this
atavism.
As a historical matter, it should be noted that while English company
law has for over a century distinguished between the private company
and the public company,17 the previous inexistence of the private
company meant that early company legislation did not focus on the
private company in trying to delineate the point at which the partnership
should end. Rather, such legislation focused on the incorporated company
simpliciter. In effect, such legislation made a distinction between all
incorporated companies on the one hand, and impermissibly large
partnerships, on the other.18 Parliament’s first Act permitting routine

17. The distinction between private and public companies first appeared in England in
the Companies Act of 1907 (7 Edw. 7, c. 50) which created special exemptions from
disclosure for private companies as encouragement for the use of the company by small
businesses. See Judith Freedman, Small Businesses and the Corporate Form: Burden or
Privilege? 57 MOD. L. REV. 555, 569 (1994). The 1907 Act was consolidated in the betterknown Companies (Consolidation) Act of 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 69) which provided the
basic structure for the first companies legislation in Nigeria—the Companies Ordinance
of 1912. On the abiding character and importance of the distinction between private and
public companies in British company law, see PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER AND DAVIES’
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 12–14 (7th ed. 2003).
18. Early companies legislation were so preoccupied with drawing a boundary
beyond which partnerships could not extend in size―a boundary beyond which partnerships
must yield to the corporate form―that some of the early Acts did not specifically indicate the
minimum number of persons required to incorporate a company, focusing only on the number
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incorporation of companies in England, the Joint Stock Companies
Registration, Incorporation and Regulation Act of 1844,19 did not, for
instance, make any distinction between private and public companies.
Rather, its focus was on the control of large partnerships with freely
transferable shares and fluctuating memberships, the indiscriminate
formation of which had contributed to the stock market abuses that
ostensibly precipitated the Bubble Act of 1720.20 With the introduction
of the private company into English companies law in 1907, the focus
shifted away from the consideration of companies generally vis-à-vis
large partnerships and, instead settled on the treatment of the private
company vis-à-vis large partnerships. This focus on controlling large,
fluctuating partnerships has since been carried forward in Anglo–
Nigerian companies legislation as manifest in § 377 of the repealed
Companies Decree 1968 and currently in § 19 of the CAMA.
The prohibition of unincorporated companies of more than twenty
persons in § 19 of the CAMA is in essence a prohibition of large
relatively unregulated partnerships, given the market abuses to which
such large partnerships have historically been prone. This prohibition
implicitly announces and endorses the relatively benign nature of
unincorporated commercial associations of twenty persons or less, while
simultaneously responding to the dangers inherent in larger unincorporated
commercial associations by compelling the latter’s incorporation. The
logic of § 20 points to a putative regulatory regime which draws a broad
distinction between unincorporated associations of twenty persons or

beyond which a partnership must become incorporated. In particular, the Joint Stock
Companies Registration, Incorporation and Regulation Act of 1844 and the Limited Liability
Act of 1855 specified only the maximum number of persons (i.e. twenty-five persons)
permitted to carry on business as a partnership without incorporation. See Companies
Registration, Incorporation and Regulation Act, 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., c. 110 (Eng.); see also The
Limited Liability Act, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict., c. 133 (Eng.). The practice of specifying the
minimum number of persons required for incorporation started with the Joint Stock
Companies Act of 1856. See The Joint Stock Companies Act, 1856, 19 & 20 Vict., c. 47
(Eng.). These statutes were essentially aimed at chaperoning, if not controlling, the growth of
partnerships or business organizations with freely transferable shares: The Bubble Act of
1720 having been repealed only about two decades earlier, there remained residual misgivings
in policy making circles about the mischief that such associations could occasion.
19. An Act for the Registration, Incorporation, and Regulation of Joint Stock
Companies, 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., c. 110 (Eng.).
20. The Bubble Act, 1720, 6 Geo. 1, c. 18 (Eng.).
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less and incorporated bodies of largely more than twenty persons.21
Such a regime seeks to bring business associations of more than twenty
persons within the heightened oversight of the CAMA.
These provisions regulating the formation of large partnerships would
have been valid in the 1968 Companies Act as well as predecessor
Nigerian companies legislation operated under nonfederal constitutional
frameworks. They would also have been similarly valid under post-1968
constitutional arrangements enacted outside the brief period of presidential
federalism from 1979 to 1983.22 Certainly these and related provisions
were also valid under the various English companies legislation from
whence they originated, especially given the unitary character of the
English government and constitution. Transposed to Nigerian companies
legislation operated under post-1954 federal constitutions with the
division of legislative competence in their legislative lists, such provisions
become problematic. They become problematic because neither the
exclusive nor the concurrent legislative list under the 1979 and 1999
Constitutions specified partnerships as a subject matter for the federal
Legislature. This was also the case under federal Constitutions of 1960
and 1963.23 As such, the regulation of partnerships is an item that falls
within the residual legislative list where it is reserved for state
legislatures. As previously indicated, there has indeed been some
recognition in practice of the states’ prerogative in this area, as indicated

21. Largely more than twenty persons because, the law would still permit as few as
two persons to form a company as is currently allowed by § 18 of CAMA. Companies
and Allied Matters Act, (1990), Cap. 59, § 18 (Nigeria). Law of the Federation of Nigeria,
Revised Edition, available at http://www.nigeria-law.org/LFNMainPage.htm.
22. Although Nigeria started operating a federal constitution in 1954, before the 1968
Companies Decree was enacted, that constitutional arrangement was supplanted by a
new constitutional order following the military coups of 1966. On this it has been written that
“after the military take-overs of January 15, 1966 and December 31 1983, the pre-existing
Constitution is permitted to continue with suitable modifications and suspensions, its
unsuspended provisions” being stated to be subject to the decrees of the military government.
See B.O. NWABUEZE, MILITARY RULE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN NIGERIA 3 (1992).
Accordingly there can be little dispute about the validity of the provision limiting the size of
partnerships under the 1968 Companies Act, which was promulgated by a military decree
and was operated under exclusively military governments until 1979.
23. Section 69 of the 1963 constitution (in Cap. 20 Laws of the Federation 1963)
just like § 64 of the predecessor 1960 constitution (in the second schedule to the Nigerian
(Constitution) Order in Council 1960) gave parliament the power to make laws for
Nigeria on matters in the exclusive and concurrent legislative list, and for the Federal
Territory (Lagos) on any matter whether or not on the legislative lists. CONSTITUTION,
§ 69 (1963) (Nigeria); CONSTITUTION, § 64 (1960) (Nigeria) These legislative lists did
not include the regulation of partnerships.
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by some state statutes regulating partnerships.24 What has not been
recognized is that the federal Legislature lacks concurrent or parallel
legislative authority over partnerships and cannot therefore legislate on it
jointly with the states so as to make its own legislation preempt or oust
state legislation in the area. The federal Legislature completely lacks
authority over partnerships per se. In furtherance of this position it should
be noted that, suggestions to the contrary notwithstanding, nothing in the
1999 Constitution indicates that the federal Legislature is vested with the
exclusive authority to regulate the forms of business association, so as to
render the states incapable of legislating in that sphere. Indeed the
legislative lists in the 1999 Constitution make it clear that the Federal
Legislature’s authority over business associations extends only to
“bodies corporate,” and even then it does not extend to all bodies
corporate. Bodies corporate, established directly by a state law as well
as cooperative societies are removed from the federal Legislature’s
competence.25
B. Ancillary Interpretive Issues
Section 19 of the CAMA, as a law made by the federal Legislature on
the subject of partnership, is not saved by Section 4(5) of the 1999
Constitution, since such a law would not be validly made; nor is it saved
by the broad powers of the Federal Government to make laws on any
matter incidental or supplementary to other matters specifically
mentioned on the exclusive legislative list.26 Section 19, as already
indicated, is a carryover from nineteenth century English legislation on
companies, which sought thereby to protect investors from the hazards
of freely transferable shares issued by large partnerships. The objective
of investor protection from large fluctuating partnerships can now be
properly secured through appropriate enactments under the Federal
Government’s power to control capital issues as provided in Item 12 to
the 1999 Constitution. In essence, if a partnership issues instruments
that are in the nature of securities, especially freely transferable
24. See for instance the partnership legislation of Lagos and Ondo States mentioned,
supra note 10.
25. See CONSTITUTION, § 31 (1979) (Nigeria); See CONSTITUTION, § 4, Item 32 (1999)
(Nigeria) (in the Exclusive Legislative List in the Second Schedule).
26. See CONSTITUTION, § 4, Item 68 (1999) (Nigeria) (in the Exclusive Legislative
List in the Second Schedule).
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securities, then that partnership comes ipso facto within the jurisdiction
of federal statutes that control such matters, notably the Investment and
Securities Act 2007 and subsidiary legislation. This is quite different
from a provision such as § 19 of CAMA that predicates federal regulation
of such partnerships on the mere fact of their having a certain number of
members. The latter approach bears no relevance to the federal policy
interests in this area, and would therefore be unsustainable as a law
related to or incidental to other specifically enumerated powers such as
the power to regulate corporate bodies. Nothing about the partnership
renders it intrinsically or conceptually an appendage of bodies corporate.
Nor would § 19—given the broad prohibition it embodies—qualify as a
law narrowly or reasonably tailored to secure federal interest in regulating
bodies corporate. The prohibition in § 19 is not an appropriate means to
the end of controlling widely distributed capital issues by partnerships.
It is not plainly adapted to that end, nor is it in broad consonance with
the spirit of the Constitution27—a federal constitution whose overarching
framework necessitates the location of powers over local affairs in state
and local governments. Partnerships, by nature, involve the most basic
arrangements for social and economic interaction in diverse locales
across the country. It is not an appropriate subject for federal legislation
or oversight.
Given the foregoing, § 19 of the CAMA becomes a provision enacted
in violation of the division and delimitation of legislative power embodied
in the current Federal Constitution and reflected in predecessor federal
27. The argument here attempts to conform to the highly deferential
standards enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court in
articulating the doctrine of incidental powers under the United States Constitution. In
this regard Justice Marshall declared: “Let the end be legitimate . . . let it be within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted
to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution,
are constitutional.” See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819) cited in
B.O. NWABUEZE, FEDERALISM IN NIGERIA UNDER THE PRESIDENTIAL CONSTITUTION 42–
43 (1983). It is nonetheless submitted that this standard is too deferential to Federal legislative
power in the context of Nigeria’s more detailed constitutions. The prolix enumeration of
powers under the various legislative lists to Nigeria’s constitutions and the definition of
incidental and supplemental powers under Part III of the legislative lists in the Second
Schedule to the 1999 constitution all counsel a less expansive approach to the interpretation of
the doctrine of incidental powers. CONSTITUTION, (1999) (Nigeria) (in the Legislative Lists in
the Second Schedule). Part III to the legislative lists in the Second Schedule defines
supplementary and incidental matters to include offences, aspects of procedure and judicial
administration as well as land acquisition. Id. If we take this definition ejusdem generis,
it is easily observed that it relates broadly to enforcement or implementation of laws
made on items over which the Federal government has specifically enumerated powers,
rather than the establishment of substantive powers of the Federal government. There is
a case for limiting the meaning of incidental powers to issues or matters of this sort.
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constitutions. Of this division of power, Sir Udoma has written that,
“The Federal Government, according to established doctrine, being a
government of enumerated powers only as contained in the Exclusive
Legislative List and the Concurrent Legislative List, it would always be
necessary at all times for it to justify its measures juridically by pointing
to some particular clauses of the Constitution as the basis of the exercise
of its power.”28 The current legislative lists, which can be traced back to
the 1953 London Constitutional Conference and the resulting constitution of
1954 reflects an arrangement envisioning a Federal Government vested
with limited (defined) powers, with the residue of powers assigned to
the state governments. This residue, denoted by the residual legislative
list, was potentially unlimited in nature, the intention of the framers of
the 1954 Constitution was to strengthen the Regional (i.e. state)
governments. “Nigerian political leaders with the support of their
different parties wanted a clear and unambiguous definition and
delimitation of the powers and functions, not of the regions, but of the
central or general government and legislature. The powers and functions
of the regional governments and legislatures were to be strengthened and
therefore to be left undefined. They were to constitute the residue.”29
This basic conceptual structure of the Federal Constitution has not
changed. Although successive constitutions have seen the progressive
allocation of disproportionate powers to the Federal Government’s
exclusive legislative list—an arrangement that has relegated the powers
in the residual list into legislative dregs of sorts. Notwithstanding this
relegation, the basic structure of the legislative lists is sufficient to
exclude the federal Legislature from legislating on partnerships.
It should be noted that under Section 315 of the 1999 Constitution, the
provisions of § 19 of the CAMA are saved as an existing law. However,
by virtue of Section 315(1)(b) of the 1999 Constitution it survives, not as
an existing Federal law, but rather as a deemed enactment of the state
legislatures since partnerships are now within the states’ legislative
competence.30 It does not survive as an existing federal law. This
means that any state can amend its partnership laws to override § 19 of
28. UDO UDOMA, HISTORY AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA 323
(1995) (commenting on the legislative lists under the 1979 and 1989 Constitutions).
29. Id. at 150 (commenting on the origins of the London Constitutional Conference of
1953 and the 1954 Constitution).
30. On the concept of existing laws under § 274 of the 1979 Constitution, which is
similar to § 315 of the 1999 constitution, see NWABUEZE, supra note 27, at 46, 70–71.
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the CAMA. Equally important for the future is the fact that legislative
reviewers of the CAMA, a federal legislation, would henceforth be
unable to reenact § 19 or its substance, since the concept of existing law
would not save such reenactment. Given prior reviews of companies
legislation that resulted in the 1968 Companies Decree and the subsequent
CAMA (1990) there is now an expectation that a comprehensive review
of Nigeria’s companies legislation would occur approximately every two
decades. Along this line of thinking, the year 2010 marks the
twentieth anniversary of the CAMA and a review should be in the
offing. Were this review to occur, it would be worth the reviewers’ time
to reassess § 19, in the light of the foregoing analysis.
C. Issues in Comparative Law
How is it that the prohibition in § 19 of CAMA has persisted for so
long after the constitutional framework that originally gave it validity
was formally replaced by a new constitutional framework under which
that prohibition is no longer sustainable? In other words, why has the
objective of constitutional change not been realized in the abandonment
of the prohibition in § 19? In any case, is this a discrete oversight
standing by itself or is it evidence of a more deep-seated and systemic
problem in the process of legal transplantation, especially given the
postcolonial setting?
Maitland famously wrote: “The forms of action we have buried but
they still rule us from their graves.”31 Just as with the forms of action, so
also with colonial doctrines. Colonial doctrines tend to be atavistic in
the post colonial setting. Although they may lose their constitutional
foundations, they sometimes continue to live on in the praxis. They
seemingly acquire a life of their own, independently of the will of the
legislature, and abide in the interstices of postcolonial norms and praxis.
Changes in legal regime entail costs. Such costs are not exhausted in the
expenses of formally enacting new legislation, but go further to
encompass the expense of time, energy, and other resources needed for
the relinquishment of established routines and entitlements at the level of
the individual citizen who has to comply with the new regime. At this
level, the citizen, like any rational maximizer of value—the quintessential
homo economicus—often would match the gains of noncompliance or
cost of compliance on the one hand, with the benefits of compliance or
the cost of noncompliance on the other hand. Where the benefits of
31. FREDERICK W. MATILAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 2 (1st ed.
1936) (1909).
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compliance or the cost of noncompliance do not meaningfully offset the
cost of compliance, the citizen as a private actor or even as a public
administrator would often retain the erstwhile rules in practice,
accommodating same with de facto adjustments and rationalizations as
necessary. The analysis here relies somewhat on Holmes’ “bad man”
theory of law. While this writer does not endorse that theory as a complete
explanation of human incentives to comply with law, the theory holds
true for a sufficiently significant number of people in certain circumstances
to merit reliance in the present context.
The American states, for instance, severed their colonial ties to
England centuries ago and rejected the English constitution. Yet in
subsequently establishing their system of corporate governance they
could not ultimately reject the fiduciary duty principles—a set of basic
principles with clear derivation from longstanding English doctrines of
equity as particularly applicable in agency situations such as those
involving business managers. These fiduciary duty principles have come to
constitute the backbone of American corporate governance. While it
may not have been so in the past, no set of rules, statutory or otherwise,
currently structures and bestrides the system of corporate governance in
America as do the fiduciary duty principles. It is the basic body of rules
to which all other principles of corporate governance have come to
constitute but a gloss of sorts. This is so notwithstanding the strident
protestation of American scholars that American corporate law is
homegrown.32 If ever those protestations were persuasive in the earlier
days of American corporate law, their persuasiveness has been lost with
the subsequent erosion of regulatory corporate law in the twentieth
century—a development which has seen a decline in the dominance of
mandatory and strict corporate governance rules in the statutes and a
concomitant accentuation of enabling corporate governance rules that were
relatively free of substantive regulation.33 With the decline of regulatory
corporate law, American corporate law, as manifest in the corporation
statutes of the various states, effectively became deregulated in a fit of
32. See JAMES WILLIARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION
IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780–1970 1–2 (1970); see also EDWIN MERRICK DODD,
AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860 1–2 (1954).

33. On the demise of regulatory corporate law and the rise of enabling corporate
law statutes, see WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN, AND GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN,
COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 89–90 (2d ed.
2007).
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interstate competition with Delaware in the lead. The strictures built
into the erstwhile structure of corporate governance by earlier state
legislatures largely vanished or waned in importance—the very strictures
on the basis of which American corporate governance might conceivably
have rightly claimed the “homegrown” status. The fiduciary duty
principles—a colonial legacy—reasserted themselves as atavistically as
any transplanted set of rules ever have, and have since become the basic
overarching framework for regulating corporate affairs, of which several
provisions of state corporate law statutes are but specific instantiations.
In a field such as corporate law which is, at its roots, a scheme of private
ordering, operators as rational maximizers of value were in essence
quick to realize that the constitutional and ideological break with
England notwithstanding, it made sense to reestablish and utilize English
agency and fiduciary law principles as the foundation of corporate law
given the relative balance of costs and benefits of not doing so.
Given the circumstances in which the American states became
independent of British rule—the relatively radical, non-negotiated
character of the American revolution and War of Independence—one
would be forgiven for expecting a more radical break with the legacy of
colonial legal doctrine especially in an area such as corporate law where
the states seemed intent upon leaving an early mark. That colonial legal
principles still play a dominant role in this field suggests that in countries
where the end of the colonial relationship was negotiated, and therefore
less radical, colonial doctrine may be harder to uproot. This is likely the
case with many African countries, which became independent from
colonial European powers after protracted but relatively peaceful
negotiations.
Nigerian securities regulation yields an interesting example of rules
which fail to yield to displacement. Since 1988, Nigeria has sought to
implement American style securities laws.34 She has found, however,
that the change is not one that is so readily affected. Nigerian corporate
governance and securities regulation laws rest on an English-style
chassis of norms, assumptions, administrative agency structure, and
interpretive traditions. American-style securities laws have had to attempt
to take root atop this pre-existing chassis of English-style rules. The
chassis seems endless in its reach and influence however, so that one
would have to change several aspects of the regulatory framework in
order to completely or substantially remove the preexisting English-style

34. See the now-repealed Securities Exchange Act, (1988) and the rules made thereunder.
The current Investment and Securities Act, (2007) continues along same broad lines.
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structure for securities regulation. The effect, therefore, is that the more
one plumbs these preexisting English rules in a bid to completely
circumscribe and remove them, the more one discovers that they are
intricately intertwined with aspects of this chassis and that their reaches
go farther than the extent previously anticipated, so that one is then
forced to stop and reconsider the whole enterprise of eliminating them.
The effect of this situation has been the persistence of an admixture of
the English-style rules with American-style legislation in the field of
Nigerian securities regulation, the former failing to give way and the
latter failing to completely take root.35 Significant regulatory suboptimality
has been the result of this situation.
As new laws are increasingly transplanted and received in the new
postcolonial environment, the atavistic nature of colonial laws suggests
that we must be careful not only with regard to successful transplantation
and establishment of the new laws, but also with regard to the initial
choices made as to what laws to transplant. Transplanted laws present the
same predicament as transplanted fauna. They may well take root
aggressively and refuse to give way long after they have served their
purpose or have become conceptually supplanted by other realities or
necessities. Transplantation must therefore not be seen as a transient
exercise. If anything, it may well be a permanent exercise of sorts since
laws, once planted and established, organically grow and become
interwoven into the legal and socioeconomic fabric of the receiving
society. The notion that such laws can be completely removed or
extinguished seems at best, a half truth. Unfortunately, some relationships
are not readily amenable to a clean break and this seems to be one.
Concerning the difficulties of receiving foreign law into a host
jurisdiction, a comparative law scholar has noted that:
It is one thing to receive law from somewhere else, but quite another to
ensure that it is as effective in the host jurisdiction as in the place where it was
conceived and developed. It is all very well to harmonize, but the need for it, the
possibility of achieving it, and the difficulties of maintaining it, are far more
controversial and difficult issues than they first appear.36

35. A specific instance of this can be seen in relation to the private placement of
securities. See George C. Nnona, Private Placement of Corporate Securities in Nigerian
Law: Realigning the Perspective on Key Issues of Doctrine and Policy, J. BUS. L. 318
nn.1–2 (2007).
36. Nicholas H. D. Foster, Journal of Comparative Law: A New Scholarly Resource,
1 J. COMP. L. 3 (2005).
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Similar sentiments were expressed earlier in Nyali, Ltd v. AttorneyGeneral, a case concerning the application of English law in British East
Africa, in which Lord Denning declared that:
The common law cannot be applied in a foreign land without considerable qualification.
Just as with an English oak, so with the English common law. You cannot
transplant it to the African continent and expect it to retain the tough character
which it has in England. It will flourish indeed but it needs careful tending. So
with the common law . . . [i]n these far off lands the people must have a law
which they understand and which they will respect. The common law cannot fulfill
this role except with considerable qualification.37

As the foregoing indicates, comparative law scholars are acquainted
with, or at least conscious of the difficulties of getting transplanted laws
to take root in host jurisdictions such as colonial territories. However,
scholars have yet to address the difficulty of getting such transplanted
laws to give way to a new dispensation when the need arises because the
colonial order has been supplanted or because the justification for the
received law has otherwise ceased to exist. It would seem, however, that in
a globalized world with exponentially multiplied opportunities for crossborder legal reception, the need for a focus on this aspect of legal
reception can hardly be gainsaid. The realization that a piece of received
legislation may not be easily eliminated from the social and legal fabric
would, at the very least, lead to enhanced circumspection in the basic
decision to receive foreign law on a subject matter, and the secondary
decision regarding what particular foreign law to receive.
A constitution in particular seems not to be something that can be
easily jettisoned after it has taken root. This is because of the extensive
reach that a constitution has on the whole society, which it penetrates
and structures in multiple ways. For legislation other than a constitution,
the wider the reach of a law or statute, the more difficult it is to remove
it or eliminate its influence even after formal repeal. This has relevance
for many developing countries in particular where there appears to be an
abiding belief in some quarters that legal revolutions can be effected
with the same dispatch and certainty as changes in government personnel
following political regime changes. The displaced legal order may not
yield as readily as presumed, even after the regime that established it has
been swept away.
It has been noted that “there is an increasing realization that all legal
systems are to some extent mixed, not just those such as Scotland and
South Africa, which are traditionally so regarded, and that mixing will

37.
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be a key component of law in the future.”38 Colonialism was indeed but
one instance, albeit an unsavory one, of internationalization resulting in
mixed plural legal systems. As we undergo another wave of
internationalization in the new global order, and legal systems undergo
increasing admixture, the lessons of the earlier internationalization and
the resultant admixture ought to be borne in mind. While the political
conditions under which laws were received in English-speaking Africa
were vastly different from the conditions under which they are being
received today in the former Soviet and communist states of East Europe
as well as post communist China and the emergent commercial centers
of the Arabian Peninsula, commonalities do exist. The received laws are
foreign laws usually designed or organically developed and tested over
long periods in foreign jurisdictions and transplanted into the receiving
jurisdictions in the hopes of replicating or approximating successes
achieved with the same laws in their jurisdictions of origin. Sometimes
the reception of foreign law is effected at the behest of influential
foreign nations or interests, or multilateral development agencies―a
process that can entail same dynamics as the colonial context, given that
the receiving country may be acting under the duress inherent in a
domestic economic or political exigency. The reception may therefore
prove to have been as coerced or compelled as reception in a colonial
setting. The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
has, for instance, gone abroad on a proselytizing mission preaching the
gospel of insider trader regulation.39 While that gospel is not one that
many outside of Western Europe found persuasive,40 in an era of Pax
38. Foster, supra note 36, at 8 (citing Esin Örücü, Mixed and Mixing Systems: A
Conceptual Search, in STUDIES IN LEGAL SYSTEMS: MIXED AND MIXING 336 (Erin Örücü,
Elspeth Attwool & Sean Coyle eds., Kluwer Law 1996), available at http://www.thejcl.
com/pdfs/foster.pdf).
39. See George C. Nnona, International Insider Trading: Reassessing the Propriety
and Feasibility of the U.S. Regulatory Approach, 27 N.C. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 185,
201–02 (2001).
40. Even in Western Europe not every constituency bought into the necessity or
fairness of the insider trading prohibition. For instance Franz Steinkuhler, a German labor
leader and member of the supervisor board of Daimler-Benz AG, traded in 1993 with
inside information on the stock of an affiliated company. “Public support for Steinkuhler
remained considerable, however, and Steinkuhler himself, while confirming that he had
engaged in the trading, admitted no wrong doing, dismissing the charges as ‘attempts to
discredit my person.’’’ Daniel James Standen, Insider Trading Reforms Sweep Across
Germany: Bracing for the Cold Winds of Change, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J. 177, 178 (1995).
See also Nnona, supra note 39, at 215–16 & 236–38.
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Americana, many jurisdictions adopted rules prohibiting insider trading,
sometimes under great pressure or inducement from the SEC.41 If and
when it is eventually sought to jettison these rules, what would such
abandonment entail in terms of time, process and impact and how
successful will it be?
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Going beyond constitutional or doctrinal validity and effectiveness,
does the provision in § 19 of the CAMA restricting partnerships to no
more than twenty persons make sense in the light of Nigeria’s broader
economic and social processes? We undertake the necessary analysis on
this point and answer the question in the negative under the subheadings
below.
A. Inefficiency and Social Sub-optimality
A partnership is basically an association of two or more persons
carrying on business together for profit. No particular formality is
required to form a partnership as persons who associate in business for
profit are prima facie deemed to be partners. Indeed, people can become
partners without knowing that they are viewed as such under the law,
provided they share the profits of an enterprise under an arrangement
that requires joint effort in pursuit of an endeavor.42 It does not matter in
this regard whether they call themselves partners or not; the law treats
them as a partnership.43 Where two or more persons carry on a business
41. See Nnona, supra note 39, at 202.
42. “See for instance section 3(1) of the Partnership Law of Lagos State, Cap. P1,
Laws of Lagos State of Nigeria 2003, which states that: “[P]artnership is the relationship
which subsists between persons carrying on a business in common with a view to profit.”
Section 4(c) of the law reinforces the centrality of profits by declaring that, [t]he receipt
by a person of a share of the profits of a business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in
the business.” Similarly, under the Partnership Act of 1890, where two or more persons
carry on a business together with the intention of making profit, they are deemed in law
to be a partnership. See C.S. OLA, COMPANY LAW IN NIGERIA 14 (Heinemann Educational
Books, 2002).
43. An instructive case is S.A. Uredi v. Jacob Dada, [1988] N.S.C.C. 197. The
respondent, Dada, was informed by the appellant Uredi, a longstanding friend of Dada,
that Uredi had obtained a construction contract at Festival village, Lagos and that there
was a lot of money to be made from the transaction. He asked Dada to provide him with
the sum of N50,000 (Fifty Thousand Naira) under an arrangement whereby Dada would
get a share of the profits of the contract. The arrangement was wholly an oral agreement.
Dada made the money available to Uredi. The Supreme Court, just like the lower courts,
had no difficulty in treating the arrangement as a partnership. Oputa J.S.C. stated thus:
“The essential element common to all partnerships is the pooling together of resources―
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together with an expectation of profit, they are deemed to be a partnership
in law.44 The sharing of profits from a joint enterprise is thus a prime
indication of the existence of a partnership. The net result of this is that
the provision of CAMA under consideration effectively renders illegal,
myriad associations or arrangements under which people conduct sundry
workaday activities ranging from hunting to trading in various communities
across the Nigerian federation. A party of twenty-one, organized to hunt
rabbits in the warrens of Aniocha, can end up an illegal association as
easily as a similarly sized troupe of musicians playing for hire in Damaturu
and environs. Such a result runs against the grain of good legislation. A
statutory provision should not proscribe myriad interactions that form part
of the workaday life of the average citizen; not without a roundly considered
and clearly articulated reason of an unassailable sort, something that is
apparently lacking here. To do otherwise would be to implement legislation
that is difficult to enforce, socially disruptive if enforced, and on the
whole suboptimal when juxtaposed with social and economic costs.
B. The Dictates of True Federalism
True federalism demands state independence―the robust assertion of
the states’ autonomy on matters falling within their legislative purview.
There is no gainsaying that Nigeria has practiced a lopsided federalism—
one in which the Federal Government is so dominant that its powers
reach into the farthest recesses of local life.45 This is conceptually a travesty
of the basic idea of federalism. It also makes for a union of enfeebled
states in which the struggle for control of federal power becomes an
intense, no-holds-barred contact sport. There is thus a need for the
assertion of state power whenever possible, in order to push back against
the disconcerting dominance that results from the concentration of
power at the federal level. Section 19 of the CAMA is perverse in this
context. It accentuates the lopsided division of power in the Constitution,
capital or labour or skill―for the purpose of business for the common benefit of the partners.
This involves the sharing of profit.” Id. at 208.
44. Ola, supra note 42, at 14.
45. See Sam Oyovbaire, Federalism and the Balance of Constitutional Power Under
the 1979 Constitution, in ISSUES IN THE 1979 CONSTITUTION (Ignatius Ayua ed., Nigerian
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 2000) (Oyovbaire notes and laments the over-dominance
of the federal government over the state governments and the unsettled foundations of
Nigerian federalism). As with the 1979 constitution, so also with the 1999 constitution.
See also Nwabueze, supra note 27, at vi–vii.
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by effectively encroaching on the legislative prerogative of the states
over partnerships. It is thus a poster child for the destabilizing imbalance
that afflicts Nigerian federalism—an obstacle on the path to true
federalism.
C. Egalitarian Imperatives
A more than thin veneer of elitism attends § 19 of the CAMA. It
grants a dispensation to partnerships involving accountants and those
involving lawyers, the quintessential professions of the Nigerian elite.
Specifically, under § 19(2) of the CAMA, such partnerships are permitted to
have more than twenty members―hundreds or thousands if need
be―without any liability. This elitist benediction deprives the provision
of that degree of social legitimacy that is so essential, if a piece of
legislation is not to constitute just another building block in the tottering
superstructure of social privilege and preferences, to which the upper
classes have for long dedicated their energies and imagination. A truly
socially legitimate exception would be far more inclusive.
There is nothing suggesting that the legal and accounting professions
in Nigeria have a better claim to exceptional treatment under § 19 than
the other occupations that engage the energy of the majority of Nigerians,
from farming to masonry. Indeed the non inclusion, for instance, of
medicine as one of the beneficiaries of the benediction granted to
professions by § 19(2) bespeaks regulatory manipulation. Nigerian
physicians and their professional associations, unlike lawyers and
accountants, are typically not drawn into policy discussions concerning
business legislation. So, they are unlikely to have been aware of the
leeway granted by § 19(2) to law and accountancy at the time § 19 and
its predecessor provisions were being introduced. In any case, if they
were aware, they clearly were not sufficiently astute in such matters to
appreciate their importance, and were thus not involved in framing and
charting the discourse as lawyers and accountants were.46 While the
46. In the documentary exchanges and discussions that preceded the enactment of
the CAMA, no physicians associations was represented, nor did any memorandum or
other submission issue from such association to the Nigerian Law Reform Commission.
Memoranda came principally from associations representing lawyers, accountants, and
other players in the financial sectors such as Equipment Leasing Association. The workshop
held in February 1988 to discuss the draft decree was similarly dominated in attendance
by such financial sector groups and their members. For a list respectively of those who sent in
memoranda to the Law Reform Commission and those who participated at the workshop,
see THE NIGERIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION REPORT ON THE REFORM OF NIGERIAN
COMPANY LAW, Vol. I. apps. 9–10, at pp. 383–84 (1988), available at http://www.nlrc.
gov.ng/publications.php?1d=2.
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physicians thus slept on the issue, law and accounting stole a march on
them and instituted the exclusive scheme of exemptions in § 19(2).47
The exemption in § 19 is therefore little more than professional privilege
and opportunism writ large. Were the exemption infused with any
genuine policy advantages it would have been extended to physicians
and perhaps other traditionally prominent professions in Nigeria. This is
not to say that such extension would, by itself, have saved the exemption
from being a pernicious manifestation of inegalitarian impulses. The
failure of such extension does, however, reinforce or underscore the
perverse provenance of the exemption.
The argument has been made that the exemption for law and
accounting in § 19 is predicated on the fact that these professions are not
permitted to practice as incorporated entities.48 Granting, arguendo, the
validity of this reason, it does not account for the non-extension of the
same exemption to other occupations whose practitioners may for

47. Anyone who doubts the legislative or regulatory scheming that goes on interprofessionally should pay heed for instance to the squabble between lawyers and accountants
over audit statements. Subsection 2 of § 359 of CAMA as promulgated in Decree #1 of
1990 provided originally that auditors’ report shall be countersigned by a legal practitioner.
This was a meal ticket inserted by lawyers into the legislation at the last moment to leach
fees off accounting by charging either accountants or accounting clients for countersigning
services. More broadly it was a professional coup d’etat that was meant to place lawyers
in the driver’s chair of the accounting enterprise by making them essentially supervisors
of the accounting profession in the heartland of the latter’s professional terrain―audit
work. It was executed at a time when accountants were weakened by perceived failures
in their audit processes as well as intra-professional rivalry between the Institute of
Chartered Accountants of Nigerian (ICAN) and the Association of National Accountants
of Nigeria (ANAN). Accountants resisted this requirement that lawyers countersign the
auditors report, and were ultimately able to have it repealed by § 4 of the Companies and
Allied Matters (Amendment) Decree No. 46 of 1991, which amended § 359 of the
CAMA to remove the requirement. It is noteworthy that there was no provision requiring
lawyers to countersign auditors’ reports in the Draft Companies Decree prepared by the
Nigerian Law Reform Commission in 1988 and circulated to various constituencies for
comment ahead of the workshop on the reform of Nigerian companies law which was
organized by the Commission from February 10–12, 1988 to discuss the draft. See THE
NIGERIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION REPORT ON THE REFORM OF NIGERIAN COMPANY
LAW, Vol. II, DRAFT COMPANIES DECREE (1987–1988), available at http://www.nlrc.gov.
ng/publications.php?id=2. Section 418(2) of this draft companies decree dealt with the
auditors report and contained no requirement that lawyers countersign it.
48. See N IGERIAN L AW R EFORM C OMMISSION , supra note 7, ¶ 12. Also see
§ 120(1) of the English Companies Act of 1967 which amended § 434 of the English
Companies Act of 1948 to introduce the exemption for partnerships of solicitors and
accountants, as now reflected in § 19(2) of CAMA. (On this see infra note 5 and the
related text.)
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various reasons find incorporation equally burdensome. The average
artisan, unlike engineers, stockbrokers and members of other literate
professions or occupations would, for instance, often find the costs and
complexities of incorporating and managing a company intimidating and
downright limiting. A case can therefore be made for the exemption of
artisans from the requirement in § 19.
Beyond the foregoing, the point can be made that indeed several
options besides the exemption in question are open to lawyers and
accountants. One clear option is for these professionals to limit their
partnerships to nineteen persons or less. This sort of restriction on
lawyers is not as unusual as it may seem at first sight, nor is it without
policy justification. In many European jurisdictions, applicable rules
(such as the Unicite de Cabinet Rule in France) historically had the
effect of limiting the size of law partnerships or even eliminating the
possibility of partnerships altogether. The idea was to, among other
things, enhance the independence of the lawyer by making him beholden
to no one other than the client and the courts—not even to his partners.49
A second option would be for the federal legislature to provide for a
modified business structure, such as the professional corporation, in
order to grant lawyers and accountants the benefit of incorporation
without losing the essence of the prohibition against lawyers practicing
as a corporation. This approach has been adopted in many American
states where lawyers and accountants can practice under a specially
designed form of business organization, the professional corporation
(PC).50 The end result of this may be to deny Nigerian lawyers and

49. Under the unicite de cabinet or single-residence requirement an avocat (advocate)
in France could establish chambers in one place only, which must be within the territorial
jurisdiction of the regional court where he is registered. This effectively precluded partnerships
with anyone other than someone registered and practicing as an advocate within the same city
or environs. Partnerships could hardly grow large with this constraint. The unicite de cabinet
rule ostensibly sought to limit an advocate’s professional practice to one place only, in order
to enable the courts there to exercise enhanced oversight of his activities—an oversight
that would be more difficult if an advocate were to practice in multiple locations or have
partners outside the place of his residence. On the unicite de cabinet requirement, see
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) decision in Ordre des Avocats au Barreau de Paris
v. Klopp, ECJ Case No. 107/83, reported in [1984] ECR 2971, [1985] 1 CMLR 99,
which overruled its application in the context of the new economic freedoms introduced
under various directives of the European Union.
50. A professional corporation is typically a corporation in which only professionals
belonging to same profession can be members. The shares are not transferable to anyone
who is not a member of the profession and the corporation may or may not possess
limited liability depending on the preference of the legislature creating the enabling statute.
On professional corporations see ROBERT W. HAMILTON, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS:
UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS AND CLOSELY-HELD CORPORATIONS 254–59 (1996).
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accountants the flexibility, economy, and privacy afforded by the
partnership form of business association—the same benefits currently
denied artisans and other ordinary folk who must incorporate any large
partnerships with which they are involved or face the rigors of the law.
But what is good for the goose ought to be good for the gander.
It is apposite to note here a relevant aspect of comparative colonial or
postcolonial professional regulation. In England, lawyers per se have
historically not been members of the aristocracy or upper classes.
Indeed, an English legal career was seen in many quarters as simply a
path to middle-class status.51 In sharp contrast to this, it is a pervasive
aspect of colonialism that in many colonies, the legal profession was not
just an avenue to the attainment or maintenance of middle-class status.
Rather the profession almost invariably constituted the “aristocracy” or
elites especially in the postcolonial period. The reasons for this may be
varied, but this is hardly the place to explore them. What is relevant is
that in many Anglophone colonies, lawyers have in the postcolonial
period assumed the status of an aristocracy themselves. Writing about
the dominance and influence of lawyers in American political life, the
French writer Alexis de Tocqueville had the following to say:
In America there are no nobles or literary men, and the people are apt to mistrust the
wealthy; lawyers consequently form the highest political class and the most
cultivated portion of society . . . . If I were asked where I place the American
Aristocracy, I should reply without hesitation that it is not among the rich, who
are united by no common tie, but that it occupies the judicial bench and the
bar . . . . Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not
resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question. Hence all parties are obliged to
borrow, in their daily controversies, the ideas, and even the language, peculiar to
judicial proceedings. As most public men are or have been legal practitioners,
they introduce the customs and technicalities of the profession into the management
of public affairs . . . . The language of the law thus becomes, in some measure, a
vulgar tongue; the spirit of the law, which is produced in the schools and courts
of justice gradually penetrates beyond their walls into the bosom of society,

51. See W. J. READER, PROFESSIONAL MEN: THE RISE OF THE PROFESSIONAL CLASSES
IN 19TH CENTURY ENGLAND, at 1, 12, 23–24 (1966) (pointing out the deeply middle class

character of the English professions, especially law, medicine and the clergy—professions for
men who had no fortune either through lack of an inheritance or otherwise). Keith
Macdonald writes that the lawyer, statesman and priest form part of the gentry and indicates
that it was their younger sons who did not succeed to family estates that turned to the
professions for livelihood. See KEITH MACDONALD, THE SOCIOLOGY OF PROFESSIONS, 75
(1995). In essence, only “fallen” gentry generally ended up in the professions, together
with common folk looking for elevation into the middle classes. Gentry who succeeded
to estates notoriously often had no need for real work of any sort.
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where it descends to the lowest classes, so that at last the whole people contract
the habits and tastes of the judicial magistrate. The lawyers of the United States
form a party which . . . extends over the whole community and penetrates into all the
classes which compose it; it acts upon the country imperceptibly, but finally
fashions it to suit its own purposes.52

These words ring as true today as they did almost two centuries ago
when they were published. The influence and status of lawyers and their
habits in America remain generally as strong today as it was in 1835
when De Tocqueville published these words.53 While not rising to same
level as in America, the political influence or dominance of lawyers as
an elite class in colonial Nigeria has also been documented.54
In the light of the above differences between the status of English
lawyers and the status of their counterparts in the colonies, a measure
such as the exemption in § 19 of the CAMA could conceivably have
been explained away in England as a measure aimed at sections of the
middle class or as an otherwise unremarkable measure. Not so in
Nigeria. Lawyers constitute a major segment of the uppermost echelon
of society and an exemption such as that under consideration assumes a
higher level of significance than might be expected in England,
especially in late Victorian or early twentieth century England.55 Those
entrusted with reviewing and adopting such laws ought therefore be
mindful of not just the capacity of the received law to thrive in the
circumstances of the host jurisdiction—apparently the dominant
consideration currently—but also the degree of alignment of such law
with emergent notions and measures of social and political legitimacy.
This is indeed another dimension of utility. An inutile or suboptimal law
does not achieve much simply because it ultimately thrives and secures
compliance by the citizens.

52. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 278–80 (1835).
53. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 257–63
(1994); see also ANOTHONG KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 4 (1993).
54. See OMONIYI ADEWOYE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN NIGERIA 1865–1962 169 et
seq. (1977). The Daily Comet, a Lagos newspaper, challenging the dominance of lawyers in
representative politics is reported to have written in 1945 that: “If butchers and coal miners
could enter the House of Commons, there was no reason why the Legislative Council of
Nigeria should be regarded as an exclusive preserve of lawyers.” Id. at 169 (citing TAKENA
TAMUNO, NIGERIA AND ELECTIVE RERESENTATION 1932–1947 64 (1966)).
55. It is instructive that the prohibition of partnerships of more than twenty persons
in § 716(1) of the U.K. Companies Act 1985 has been repealed and omitted from the
Companies Act 2006, which came into full force in October 2009. While such repeal is
not a desideratum of legitimacy for the arguments canvassed in this paper, the repeal does
provide further reinforcement for those arguments. See supra note 6.
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V. CONCLUSION
Section 19 of the CAMA, in restricting the size of partnerships,
implicates unconstitutionality and socioeconomic inutility. There is thus
a clear need for its adjustment, especially in the context of future
revisions of the CAMA. Even before such a revision occurs, the states
whose constitutional competence is circumscribed thereby, should be
quick to assert their powers in this area by contestations in court and out
of court. Such contests should prove to be fertile grounds for the creativity
of the Nigerian judiciary which should rise up to the task of enhancing
federalism through the affirmation of robust state rights in the areas
within the states’ legislative competence under the Constitution. In the
postcolonial Nigerian context, this would be an important step towards
dispensing with the vestiges of subterranean unitarianism in constitutional
praxis. It is tempting in connection with partnerships for states to be
complacent, on the assumption that partnerships are not really economically
important. This would be a very myopic perspective. Quite apart from
the issues of principle involved is indeed the fact that the partnership as
a form of business organization—existentially the oldest form—holds
immense possibilities for economic benefits, if an imaginative mind is
brought to its regulation and management.
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